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THE MYTH OF PRETAX INCOME
Lawrence Zelenak*

By Liam Murphy
New York: Oxford University Press. 2002. Pp. ix,

THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE.

and Thomas
228. $25.

Nagel.

I.

EXPOSING THE MYTH

What constitutes a fair distribution of the burdens of taxation
among the members of a society? Even as politicians and academics
vigorously debate the answer to that question, there is widespread
agreement that all are asking the right question. In The Myth of
Ownership, however, Liam Murphy1 and Thomas Nagel2 claim that
everyone has been asking the wrong question. To ask about the fair
distribution of tax burdens is to take the distribution of pretax incomes
as "presumptively just," so that justice in taxation "is a question of
what justifies departures from that baseline" (p. 15). But Murphy and
Nagel claim that pretax income is a myth, and, as such, has no moral
significance.
How can my pretax income be a myth, when I can read it on my
W-2? Their argument goes as follows: Pretax income means income in
the absence of taxes. But in the absence of taxes there would be no
government, in the absence of government there would be anarchy,
and in a state of anarchy no op.e would have any income.3 Pretax in
come, then, must be zero - or, equivalently, there is no such thing as
pretax income. If there is no such thing as pretax income, obviously
people cannot be entitled to it. Instead, "[a]ll they can be entitled to is
what they would be left with after taxes under a legitimate system,
supported by legitimate taxation - and this shows that we cannot
evaluate the legitimacy of taxes by reference to pretax income" (pp.
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1. Professor, New York University School of Law.
2. Professor, New York University School of Law.
3. P. 32.

There is no market without government and no government without taxes . . . . In the ab
sence of a legal system supported by taxes, there couldn't be money, banks, corporations,
stock exchanges, patents, or a modern market economy - none of the institutions that make
possible the existence of almost all contemporary forms of income and wealth.
Id.
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32-33). In brief, justice in taxation is a matter of the distribution of
after-tax incomes, not a matter of the distribution of tax burdens.
More briefly still: "Outcomes, not Burdens" (p. 98).
To Murphy and Nagel, their way of framing the question is obviously correct and the burden formulation is clearly wrong - so much
so that they find it "puzzling how anyone could have been attracted to
[the dominant way] of thinking about tax justice" (p. 34). Their expla
nation of the puzzle is that people are enthralled by "everyday liber
tarianism" - "an unexamined and generally nonexplicit assumption"
(p. 36) that one earns pretax income without any help from the gov
ernment, so that the government bears a heavy burden of justification
in taxing any of it away.4
I am persuaded that Murphy and Nagel are right and that everyday
libertarianism is wrong - not as a debatable question of policy, but as
an inescapable matter of logic.5 I share their frustration that "the
robust and compelling fantasy" (p. 176) of pretax income has such
deep roots that it probably cannot be dislodged by logical arguments.
That their efforts to refocus the debate are doomed is suggested by the
fact - not noted by Murphy and Nagel - that the prominent econo- '
mist Carl Shoup made precisely the same point as Murphy and Nagel
in his public finance treatise more than thirty years ago, to no dis
cernible effect.6 For that matter, the point is implicit in Justice
Holmes's famous remark, "I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civili
zation. "7 Perhaps times have changed, or perhaps the point will prove

·

·

·

4. Pp. 31-37 (discussing and critiquing everyday libertarianism).
5. Their argument is only as good as their assumptions that (1) people would not be able
to produce any income in a state of anarchy, and (2) there would be anarchy in the absence
of taxes. Both assumptions are highly plausible.
6. CARL S. SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 577-78 (1969), quoted in Michael J. Graetz, Dis
tributional Tables, Tax Legislation, and the Illusion of Precision, in DISTRIBUTIONAL

ANALYSIS OF TAX POLICY 15, 25 (David F. Bradford ed., 1995):
To say, for example. that households with before-tax incomes between $2,000 and $5,000 pay
12 percent of that income in taxes . . . is to make a statement that is without significance
because it is conceptually invalid. It is conceptually invalid because it postulates, for implicit
comparison, a state of affairs in which there are no taxes whatever . . . hence impliedly no
government services, not even of the minimum type and amount necessary to assure exis
tence of the society. . . . [This] objection is conclusive.
Kenneth J. Arrow has made a similar point:
There are large gains to social interaction above and beyond what the individuals and sub
groups could achieve on their own. The owners of scarce personal assets do not have a pri
vate use of these assets which is considerable; it is only their value in a large system which
makes these assets valuable. Hence, there is a surplus created by the existence of society as
such which is available for redistribution.
Kenneth J. Arrow, Nozick's Entitlement Theory of Justice, 7 PH!LOSOPHIA 265, 278-79
(1978).
7. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 277 (1947) (quoting Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Compania General de
Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("Taxes are what we pay for civilized society. ").

May 2003]

The Myth of Pretax Income

2263

more persuasive when expanded to book length; but more likely,
everyday libertarianism is here to stay. Murphy and Nagel agree with
that gloomy prediction,8 and their resulting frustration is evident in the
way they repeat their basic point - by their own admission, "ad
nauseam" (p. 164) - throughout the book. Cassandra-like, they know
they are right, but that few will believe them.
A striking example of the influence of everyday libertarianism (not
mentioned by Murphy and Nagel) is Congress's disproportionate con
cern about earned income tax credit ("EITC") cheating relative to
concern about other forms of income tax cheating. In 1997, Congress
directed the Treasury to spend up to $716 million over the next five
fiscal years (1998 through 2002) on EITC "enforcement initiatives.';9
As a result, returns claiming the EITC accounted for 44 percent of all
audits in 2000, and in 1999 taxpayers with incomes below $25,000 were
more likely to be audited than taxpayers with incomes above
$100,000.1° Cheating on the EITC probably represents less than 10
percent of the total income tax gap (i.e., the amount of tax owed but
not collected),11 so it is virtually inconceivable that such a heavy
emphasis on the EITC gives the government the most bang for its
enforcement dollar. What, then, explains the EITC crackdown? The
EITC ·is refundable, which means it results in a net transfer from the
government to the person claiming the credit if the EITC exceeds the
person's precredit income tax liability (as it usually does). Thus,
cheating on the EITC typically results in an unwarranted payment
from the government to the cheater. Other (more traditional?) forms
of tax cheating result in a taxpayer's failure to make a legally
mandated payment to the government. Both results are contrary to
law, of course, and one might suppose that one person's receiving a
dollar too much EITC is no worse than another person's paying a
dollar too little tax. Under the influence of everyday libertarianism,
however,
Congress seems to believe that a dollar too much EITC received is
worse than a dollar too little tax paid. An underpayment of tax merely
allows the taxpayer to keep more of his pretax income, and the gov
ernment's right to take away any of his pretax income was dubious to

8. "We recognize that it is a lot to hope that this philosophical point should be
psychologically real to most people. " P. 176.
9. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 5702, 111 Stat. 251, 648 (1997).
10. David Cay Johnston, Rate of All l.R.S. Audits Falls; Poor Face Special Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at Al.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT:
ADMINISTRATION OF THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT (2000) (comparing one study's esti
mate of EITC overclaims of $9.3 billion for 1997 with another study's estimated total income
tax gap of $93.2 to $95.2 billion for 1992), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/reports/
200040160fr.pdf.
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begin with. By contrast, the everyday libertarian has no sympathy for
the EITC cheater's attempt to obtain an illegal transfer payment.
To a reader persuaded by the book's critique of everyday libertari
anism, two questions present themselves. How would the tax system
change if Murphy and Nagel succeeded in replacing the current debate
about tax burdens with a debate about outcomes? And what could be
done to improve their prospects of changing the terms of the debate?
In the remainder of this Review, I address those questions.
II.

WOULD A DIFFERENT QUESTION PRODUCE A DIFFERENT

ANSWER?
Today, almost everyone (except Murphy, Nagel, and this reviewer)
agrees that fairness in taxation requires an appropriate distribution of
the tax burden, starting from the baseline of pretax income.12 Despite
this agreement on the question, there is no agreement on the answer.
To some, justice requires an income tax base, while others insist that
consumption is the only fair tax base. To some, progressive marginal
tax rates are morally required; to others progressive rates are
anathema. Just as the current agreement on the (wrong) question does
not produce agreement on the answers, no particular tax structure
necessarily follows from Murphy and Nagel's focus on outcomes.
Nevertheless, asking a different question is likely to produce a differ
ent set of answers.
As an example, consider the debate early in the presidency of .
George W. Bush over how taxes should be cut in response to the (late
lamented) federal budget surplus. The President's position, which
largely prevailed in Congress,13 was that income tax burdens should be ,
decreased by the same percentage across the board. If the government
could get by with six percent less revenue, then a rich person currently ,
paying $100,000 in income tax would have his liability reduced by
$6,000, a middle-income person currently paying $10,000 would
receive a $600 reduction, and a lower-income taxpayer currently pay
ing $1,000 would have his liability reduced by $60. This is a plausible
position, if fairness in taxation is about the distribution of tax burdens.

·

·

12. The literature on optimal income taxation is an important exception. As Murphy
and Nagel acknowledge, this literature "approaches the topic [of tax justice] in the right way,
investigating outcomes rather than the distribution of burdens." P. 136. The seminal work in '
the field is J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38
REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971). For an excellent book-length exploration of the field, see :
MATTI TUOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX AND REDISTRIBUTION (1990). For a nontechni
cal introduction to optimal income tax analysis, see Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Moreland,
Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis? 53 TAX L. REV. 51 (1999).
13. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
ll5 Stat. 38 (2001). For the President's original proposal, see George W. Bush, A Blueprint
for New Beginnings: A Responsible Budget for America's Priorities, Mar. 1, 2001, available at
LEXIS, Tax Analysts Tax Notes Today Library, 2001 TNT 41-13.
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If the existing distribution of burdens ($100,000, $10,000, $1,000) was
fair before the surplus, and if the surplus is the only change in circum
stances, then it seems fair to retain the pre-surplus liability ratios
under the new conditions. If, however, the right question is about the
distribution of after-tax incomes, the intuitively fair thing might be to
cut taxes so that taxpayers at all income levels enjoyed the same per
centage increase in after-tax income. Cases could be made for much
more progressive distributions of the budget surplus - such as
distributing the surplus pro rata or even using the entire surplus to
increase the after-tax incomes of the poorest members of society.
Using the surplus to increase everyone's pretax income by the same
percentage is the least progressive plausible answer, under an out
comes-based approach.
The difference between an across-the-board decrease in tax liabili
ties and an across-the-board increase in after-tax incomes is illustrated
by the following example. Imagine a country with just two sorts of
taxpayers, the Highs and the Lows, with an equal number of each.
Each High taxpayer has $100,000 of pretax income and pays $40,000
tax (representing an average rate of 40%). Each Low taxpayer has
$25,000 of pretax income and pays $5,000 tax (representing an average
rate of 20%). The government thus collects $45,000 tax from each
High-Low pair. Now suppose that for some reason - perhaps a dra
matic increase in bureaucratic efficiency - the government decides it
can get along perfectly well on 20% less revenue. This means the
$45,000 tax liability of each High-Low pair can be reduced by $9,000.
If each taxpayer's liability is to be reduced by 20% - the result sug
gested by the burdens question - a High taxpayer will receive an
$8,000 tax cut and a Low taxpayer will receive a $1,000 tax cut. If each
taxpayer's after-tax income is to be increased by the same percentage
- the least progressive of the results suggested by the outcomes ques
tion - the appropriate tax cut will be quite different. Before the tax
cut, each High-Low pair had $80,000 of after-tax income ($60,000 for
each High and $20,000 for each Low), and the government can now
afford to increase their combined after-tax income by $9,000, or
11.25%. To increase the after-tax incomes of High and Low by the
same 11.25%, the government should give High a tax cut of $6,750,14
and Low a tax cut of $2,250.15 Even under this least progressive of
plausible answers to the outcomes question, Low's tax cut is more
than twice as large as under the most likely answer to the burdens
question. To generalize the point: distributing the benefit of a tax cut
in proportion to after-tax incomes, rather than in proportion to tax
14. This increases High's after-tax income to $66,750, which is an increase of 11.25%
from $60,000.
15. This increases Low's after-tax income to $22,250, which is an increase of 1 1.25%
from $20,000.
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liabilities, will be advantageous to Low whenever Low's after-tax
income is a higher percentage of High's after-tax income than Low's
tax liability is of High's tax liability - a condition which will obtain
whenever the existing tax system is progressive.
The above analysis suggests that tax cuts will generally be distrib
uted more progressively if the focus is on outcomes than if the focus is
on burdens. What about the distribution of tax increases? Take the
same starting situation as in the example above, but this time assume
the government needs an additional $9,000 revenue from each High
Low pair. If the burdens question suggests a proportionate increase in
tax liabilities, the government will collect $8,000 more from High and
$1,000 more from Low. If the outcomes question suggests a propor
tionate decrease in after-tax incomes, the government will collect
$6,750 more from High and $2,250 more from Low.16 Thus, it is not
inevitable that the outcomes question will produce more progressive
results than the burdens question. Perhaps all that can be said with a
high level of confidence is that the different questions will (not sur
prisingly) tend to produce different answers. Still, my intuition is that
the outcomes question will tend to produce more progressive results
than the burdens question, even in the case of tax increases. After all,
there are a number of plausible answers to the outcomes question, of
which distributing a tax increase in proportion to after-tax incomes is
the least progressive. A focus on outcomes might lead most of the
electorate to conclude that the burden of the tax increase should fall
entirely, or nearly entirely, on the Highs - especially if any additional
tax on the Lows would drive them below the poverty level.
The preceding discussion considers how the burdens and outcomes
questions might produce different results when tax revenues are to be
increased or decreased in response to changing budgetary conditions.
Just as important, however, are the different responses the two ques
tions are likely to generate to changes in levels of income inequality.
In 1980, the average CEO of a major public corporation earned fortytwo times as much as the average worker; by 2000, that had increased
to 531 times as much.17 This is a striking example of the general
increase in income inequality over the last two decades. In 1979, the
highest quintile of American households received 46% of all pretax .
income and the lowest quintile received 5%; by 1997, the highest
quintile's share had risen to 53% and the lowest quintile's share had
fallen to 4%.18 Over the same period the share of pretax income
received by the top 1% of households almost doubled, from 9% to

·

16. This would reduce High's after-tax income from $60,000 to $53,250, and Low's from
$20,000 to $17,750. Both are 11.25% reductions.
17. Editorial, CEOs: Why They're So Unloved, Bus. WK., Apr. 22, 2002, at 118.
18. CONG. BUDGET OFF., EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES, 1979-1997, at 7 fig.1-6
(2001 ).

·
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How should the tax system respond to this growing inequality?
Under the burdens question, it is not obvious that the tax system
should respond at all, as long as the growing inequality does not neces
sitate revenue-driven tax law changes. Once we have determined the
appropriate tax liabilities to impose on persons at every income level,
there is no reason to revisit those determinations just because the
numbers of persons at various levels have changed. In sharp contrast,
to ask the outcomes question is to raise the possibility that the tax sys
tem might be used to counteract growing pretax inequality. If we think
it is just (or at least not unjust) for CE Os to earn 42 times as much as
the average worker, but that it is unjust for CEOs to earn 531 times as
much, we might change the tax laws in ways which would push after
tax outcomes in the right direction.20 The progressivity of the currept
income tax makes the distribution of after-tax income somewhat less
unequal than the distribution of pretax income.21 Nevertheless, in 1997
the after-tax income of the highest quintile of American households
was more than ten times that of the lowest quintile - compared to
less than seven times in 1979.22 Obviously, the income tax could be
used much more aggressively in reducing after-tax income inequality.
Murphy and Nagel would agree with my belief that a focus on out
comes rather than burdens would tend to produce more progressive
tax (and transfer) policies, but they also reach a number of specific
conclusions about the structure of a fair tax system. For example, they
conclude that an income tax is preferable to a consumption tax (pp.
96-129), that the tax system should be significantly progressive (pp.
130-41), that gratuitous transfers should be taxed as income to recipi
ents and should not be deductible by transferors (pp. 142-61), and that
a number of itemized deductions should be converted to credits (pp.
126-28, 165). Their discussions of these issues are thoughtful, but they
lack the compelling - almost syllogistic - force of their argument for
focusing on outcomes rather than on burdens.
It is interesting to read how a focus on outcomes would lead
Murphy and Nagel to design a tax-and-transfer system; but other
thoughtful people also concerned about outcomes might reach differ
ent conclusions - just as some people concerned about burdens favor
a progressive income tax while others concerned about burdens favor
a flat rate consumption tax. In their discussions of particular design
16%.19

19. Id.
20. This might involve both an increase in the tax rates generally applicable to very
high-income taxpayers, and narrowly targeted changes to the tax treatment of stock options
and other forms of compensation favored by corporate executives.
21. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 18, at 7 fig.1-6 (distribution of pretax income); id.
at 13 fig.1-12 (distribution of after-tax income).
22. Id. at 13-15 (text accompanying Figure 1-12).
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issues, Murphy and Nagel seem to assume the outcomes question·
answers itself more than it really does.
III.

CHANGING THE T ERM S OF THE DEBATE

In the end, everyday libertarianism and the myth of pretax income
may be too firmly entrenched to be dislodged by any means. In a
hopeful vein, however, I offer three suggestions designed to increase
the attention paid to outcomes in tax policy debates.
A

Be Careful to Avoid Being Misunderstood

Conservative reviewers of The Myth of Ownership have been out
raged. Stephen Moore of the Cato Institute offered two summaries of
the book's central claim: "Americans should stop whining so much
about taxes and instead be happy with the money that the govern
ment, in its benevolence, allows us to keep," and "[t]he government
owns the fruits of your labor, and your real income is what Uncle Sam
permits you to keep."23 Similarly, Richard Epstein described the book
as claiming that "property is a myth," and that "our rights [are]
entirely contingent on government."24 These are not fair characteriza
tions of the book. Rather than claiming that property is a myth and
that the government would be entitled to keep all the fruits of one's
labor were it so inclined, Murphy and Nagel write that
[p]eople do have a right to their income, but its moral force depends on
the background of procedures and institutions against which they have
acquired that income - procedures that are fair only if they include
taxation to support various forms of equality of opportunity, public
goods, distributive justice, and so forth. (p. 74)

Late in the book, they disassociate their argument from "the claim
that the entire social product really belongs to the government, and
that all after-tax income should be seen as a kind of dole that each of.
us receives from the government, if it chooses to look on us with
favor" (p. 176). Clearly, Murphy and Nagel would consider a system in.
which the government confiscated everyone's income (and gave it to
whom?) unjust. Nevertheless, it is understandable that persons might
misread them, given that (1) they do not explicitly disavow the gov
ernment-is-entitled-to-everything position until page 176 of a 190-page
text, and (2) their chosen title
The Myth of Ownership
promotes
-

-

23. Stephen Moore, In Their Own Words, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Apr. 23, 2002 (review
ing The Myth of Ownership), at http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.asp?ref=
/moore/moore042302.asp.
24. Richard A. Epstein, Myth-Making on Taxes, NAT'L REV., July l, 2002, at 49 (re
viewing The Myth of Ownership).
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that misreading.25 In fact, the title does not accurately reflect their
argument. They do not claim that ownership is a myth, but only that
pretax income is a myth. An accurate - albeit less catchy and pro
vocative - title would have been "The Myth of Pretax Income." Even
with the most careful presentation, it would be difficult to persuade
the American public that pretax income is a myth. The task becomes
impossible, though, if the packaging of the argument leads people to
misperceive it as an argument that all private property is a myth and
that the government is entitled to claim the entire gross national prod
uct.
B.

Institutionalize Data on the Distribution of After-Tax Income

There is a wealth of data available from government sources on
the distribution of tax burdens. Distributional analyses of the effects of
proposed legislation, prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation ("JCT") and by Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis ("OTA"),
are regularly used by Congress during legislative deliberations.26 The
Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") also provides distributional
analyses, although not generally in connection with proposed legisla
tion. 27 Finally, the IRS provides a mass of information on the distribu
tion of tax burdens in its Statistics of Income publications.28 It is
surprisingly hard, however, to find information on the distribution of
after-tax income29 - and information on the effect of proposed legis
lation on the distribution of after-tax income is usually nonexistent. In
an essay published in 1995, Michael Graetz suggested that distribu
tional analyses should focus on after-tax income,30 but to date his
suggestion has not been adopted. The most practical thing that could
be done in the short term to promote an interest in outcomes rather
than burdens would be the adoption of Graetz's suggestion - either
by legislation or by the JCT Staff and the OT A on their own initiative.
25. It is possible that, rather than being genuinely confused, Moore and Epstein pur
posely mischaracterized the book's argument for rhetorical purposes. Even if the mischarac
terizations were intentional, they were made plausible by the title of the book and by the
book's failure to disclaim the government-owns-everything argument earlier and more force
fully.
26. Graetz, supra note 6, at 19- 24.
27. Id. at 20.
28. The IRS Statistics of Income ("SOI ") program regularly publishes statistical analy
ses based on tax return information. Recent studies are available, under the heading of "tax
stats, " at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov.
29. Contrary to the usual practice, a considerable amount of information on the distri
bution of after-tax income is contained in CBO reports. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra
note 18.
30. Graetz, supra note 6, at 30 ("Ultimately it is the impact of legislation on the distribu
tion of aftertax incomes that should be of concern in analyzing distributional consequences
of legislative changes. ").
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The obvious analogy is to the institutionalization of the tax expen-,
diture concept in the form of tax expenditure budgets regularly pre
pared by both the JCT Staff and by the Treasury Department.31 The
tax expenditure budgets remind Congress that the budgetary costs of
indirect subsidies contained in the Internal Revenue Code - in the
forms of exclusions, deductions, and credits - are just as real as the
costs of direct cash subsidies.32 The early proponents of the tax expen
diture concept generally hoped that an institutionalized tax expendi
ture budget would dampen legislative enthusiasm for tax expenditures,
as Congress came to understand their true costs.33 Tax expenditures
are very much alive and well today, but it is impossible to say whether
their growth would have been even more exuberant without the peri
odic reminders of their cost. The limited restraining effect - if any -'
of tax expenditure budgets suggests that a proponent of outcomes
based tax policy should not expect too much from the regular produc
tion of distributional analyses of after-tax income. Congress can al-.
ways ignore the information if it chooses. The availability of such·
analyses may not be sufficient to change the terms of the debate, but it
is clearly necessary. In the absence of information on outcomes, out
comes-driven tax legislation is impossible. An encouraging· aspect of
the analogy to the tax expenditure budget is that the modest goal does
not seem out of reach. It was possible once to persuade Congress to
spend a trifling amount of money to produce some interesting infor
mation; it might be possible to do so again. It might even be easier this·
time, since the very idea of tax expenditures was (and still is) contro
versial, whereas nobody doubts the existence or importance of after
tax income.
C.

Designing the Tax System to Decrease the Power of the Myth

The power of the myth of pretax income may depend on the design
of a tax system. The myth seems most powerful when a taxpayer
receives the entire amount of her pretax income in cash, and then
must hand over a portion of it to the government. This is the case with
forms of income not subject to withholding, such as interest, dividends,.

3l. The annual preparation and submission of a tax expenditure budget by the Execu-.
tive Branch is mandated by statute. 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (2000). For a recent example of
the nonmandatory tax expenditure budget prepared by the JCT Staff, see STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2002-2006 (Comm. Print 2002).
32. On the tax expenditure concept generally, see STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R.'
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985). See also Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a De
vice for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expendi
tures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).

33. See, e.g., STANLEY s. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 179-207 (1973).
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and self-employment income.34 The myth seems less powerful with
respect to wages and salaries, which are subject to withholding.35 For
an employee whose salary is subject to withholding, pretax income is
just a number on her pay stub; it lacks the visceral reality of take
home pay.36 At the other extreme from income not subject to with
holding, the myth is vanquished by the form of the employer's share of
the social security wage tax.37 This portion of the social security tax is
imposed on the employer (although economists agree the economic
burden of the tax falls on the employee38), so that the amount of the
tax is not nominally a part of the employee's pretax income. With the
amount of this tax not included in pretax income, few employees
understand the tax as depriving them of something to which they are
presumptively entitled.
These differences suggest that one way of combating the myth of
pretax income would be to design taxes in ways that lessen the power
of the myth. Withholding is better than no withholding, and shifting
the nominal burden of taxation away from individuals may be better
still. If one's view of tax justice requires progressivity, however, the
strategy exemplified by the employer's social security tax will have
limited appeal, because it is difficult or impossible to design a satisfac
torily progressive tax system if taxes are not nominally imposed on
individuals.39
That leaves withholding as the most promising means of combating
the myth. Wages have been subject to withholding since World War
11,40 and the myth of pretax wages has nevertheless survived, but
imagine how much more powerful the myth might be today without
withholding. Very likely, without withholding, the myth would have
34. But see I.RC. § 3402(p)(3)(B) (2000) (imposing "backup " withholding on interest
and dividends under limited circumstances).
The myth of entitlement is probably stronger still with respect to estate and gift taxes. A
taxpayer has his hands on interest and dividend income. for only a few months before the
income tax becomes due, but a taxpayer may have held property for decades - thus
strengthening his sense of absolute entitlement - before a transfer tax becomes due with
respect to the property.
35. See I.RC. § 3402 (2000) (imposing the withholding requirement on wages, but not
on income from other sources).
36. As Edward J. McCaffery has explained, people are less pained by - and thus less
resistant to - "pay[ing] a tax imputedly, by never receiving money in the first place, rather
than directly, by first receiving money and then having to give some of it back. " Edward J.
McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA].,. REV. 1861, 1875 (1994).
37. I.RC § 3111 (2000).
38. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 285-86 (4th ed. 1995).
39. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate
and Base, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 197, 200-02 (1999) (explaining that a retail sales tax or a value
added tax cannot be graduated according to an individual's level of consumption).
40. Withholding was introduced by the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No.
78-68, 57 Stat. 126 (1943).
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made a broad-based income tax impossible. In 1940, at the beginning
of World War II, only about seven million Americans had any income
tax liability; by 1945, the tax rolls had expanded to more than forty
two-million Americans.41 The financing of the war necessitated the
conversion of the income tax to a mass tax. The conversion was politi
cally possible because of the popularity of the war effort, and because
the introduction of wage withholding lessened the psychological
burden of the tax. As David Brinkley noted, "(P]eople were paying
their taxes with not much resistance because they were paying with
money that they had never even seen. The term 'take home pay' now
entered the language. "42 The weakening of the myth of pretax income
by withholding was essential to the continuation of the income tax as a
mass tax after the war emergency had ended.43
The myth's power might be further reduced if withholding at the
source could be extended to other types of income, most notably in
terest and dividends. There is, however, a major problem with this
strategy. Once withholding is firmly established it decreases the force
of the myth, but the myth makes it extremely difficult to establish
withholding in the first place. Absent a fiscal emergency comparable
to World War II, significant extension of withholding may be impossi,
ble. That seems to be the lesson of the short, unhappy life of interest
and dividend withholding during the early 1980s. The Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 required payors to withhold income
tax (at the rate of 10 percent) on most interest and dividend pay
ments.44 This was followed, almost immediately, by a massive public
outcry - stirred up by the American Bankers Association - against
withholding.45 Members of Congress received up to 750,000 pieces of
constituent mail a day on the issue - more than the volume generated
by Watergate.46 Skillfully exploiting the myth of pretax income, the
bankers persuaded millions of depositors that withholding was a new
tax, rather than simply a means of collecting an existing tax. Despite
widespread media denunciations of the bankers' tactics47 and the resis41. Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion
of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 686 (1989) (citing BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, SER. NO. Y402-411, HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES 1110 (1975)).
42. DAVID BRINKLEY, WASHINGTON GOES TO WAR 219 (1988).
43. See Jones, supra note 41, at 730 ("By implementing an unobtrusive means for the
collection of a direct tax, the U.S. government succeeded not only in financing World War
II, but also in sustaining the income tax on a mass scale after V-J Day.") .
44. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 301, 96 Stat.
324, 576-85 (1982).
45. Jonathan Alter, Behind the Banks' Victory, NEWSWEEK, May 2, 1983, at 28.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he banks inaccurately portrayed withholding as a new tax . . . . " );
Brave Democrats and Withholding, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1983, at A22 ("Of all the agitating
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tance of the chairs of both tax-writing committees,48 the campaign for
repeal succeeded in 1983 with the passage of the ironically named
Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act.49 The lesson of this
history? Perhaps that little short of a world war can create a political
climate in which major reforms designed to reduce the power of the
myth of pretax income are possible.
If major extensions of withholding were politically feasible, there
would be an interesting moral question as to their legitimacy. The idea
behind expanded withholding is that two wrongs might make a right
- that taxpayers' misperception that a tax system featuring with
holding is fundamentally different from a tax system lacking with
holding should be used to counteract their misperception that pretax
income is real (and that they are presumptively entitled to all of it).
Whether the worthy end justifies the devious means is a question on
which reasonable people may differ.50 The point is moot, though, as
long as expanded withholding remains politically impossible.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Very early in The Myth of Ownership, Murphy and Nagel observe
that questions of tax justice "have generated less sophisticated discus
sion, from a moral point of view, than other public questions that have
a moral dimension" (pp. 3-4). As an occasional contributor to the
literature on fairness in taxation, I ruefully concede the accuracy of
their judgment. The Myth of Ownership significantly increases the so
phistication of the discussion.
For those who continue to believe that tax justice is a matter of the
distribution of burdens relative to pretax income, the next step should
be to respond to Murphy and Nagel's actual argument - rather than
distortions the bankers have circulated, the most flagrant is that withholding is a new tax.
That's not merely distortion but a lie."); A Charter for Evasion, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 23,
1983, at 25 ("The response of many banks . . . was to launch an unscrupulous campaign
which suggested to depositors that they would be losing substantial sums that belonged to
them."); Day of Reckoning . . . , WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1983, at A20 ("[M]any people have
been led by the banks' own propaganda to believe that a new tax is being imposed.").
48. News Release, Dole Confronts Bankers on Withholding, 18 TAX NOTES 776 (1983).
In a speech to the American Bankers Association, Senate Finance Committee Chairman
Robert Dole remarked, "A constituent writes me to criticize your organization's campaign,
saying 'the impression is certainly created that the withholding constitutes some new form of
tax and imposes some horrendous new burdens on savers. I agree . . . . Id. at 776; Voting the
Bankers' Way, TIME, May 30, 1983, at 12 (" 'Today we ·are conceding control of the tax sys
tem to a special interest that has won the day largely by deceiving American taxpayers.' "
(quoting Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski)).
49. Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369
(1983).
50. For one view, see McCaffery, supra note 36, at 1943 (discussing the ethics of taking
advantage of cognitive errors in furtherance of good tax policy goals, and concluding that the
tactic is "fraught with dangers " and "runs afoul of basic moral notions").
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to mischaracterize their position (inadvertently or intentionally ). For
those who are persuaded by Murphy and Nagel's basic point, there are
two projects worth pursuing. One is to develop one's own answer to
the question of how taxation can further the goal of a fair distribution
of after-tax outcomes - an answer which may be very different from
Murphy and Nagel's. The other is to help persuade Congress and the
American public that the outcomes question is the right question. A
first step in that direction would be to institutionalize - in Congress
and the Executive Branch - the regular preparation and dissemina
tion of distributional analyses of after-tax incomes.
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